“PRIORITISING CARIBBEAN SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: PREVENTING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM”

2 - 3 October, 2019

University of the Southern Caribbean
Maracas, St Joseph

CONFERENCE CHAIR REPORT
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE SOUTHERN CARIBBEAN CONFERENCE
INTRODUCTION

On October 2-3 2019, the University of the Southern Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago hosted an international conference entitled "Prioritizing Caribbean Security in the 21st Century: Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Counter-Terrorism." Attendees and participants spanned a wide cross section of local and international professionals from both the academic and non-academic communities who presented and discussed new methods and approaches to preventing and combating violent extremism (CVE) and Terrorism. Currently, CVE is deemed to be one of the greatest threats to our societies and requires urgent attention, response and commitment in order to prevent its occurrence. Most importantly, law enforcement and intelligence agencies have recognized that countering violent extremism and terrorism at the sharp end isn’t enough – prevention is fundamental if we are to reduce its impacts on society.

In this regard, it is crucial to examine existing societal problems such as poverty, inequality, and the lack of opportunities which are contributing factors to increasing violent extremism and terrorism. These challenges have led to alienation, polarization and destabilization of our societies which fuel the latter. Furthermore, there was a dearth of information, analysis and dialogue on CVE and terrorism within our communities. It is against this backdrop that the University of the Southern Caribbean (USC) and other key Institutions united to initiate discussions on these areas.

BACKGROUND

There is no internationally agreed definition of “violent extremism”. In P/CVE theory it is generally described as the way people come to embrace “radical” views and ideas that can lead to violent action, which may be inspired by or linked to groups and/or individuals described as “terrorists”. The dominant but contested theory of “violent extremism” focuses on social and political grievances (e.g. poverty, marginalization, lack of professional opportunities, political oppression and perceived injustices) that can be exploited to persuade individuals to support or commit to ideologically-motivated violence in order to further political goals. While counter-terrorism generally refers to the coercive measures States use to tackle “terrorism” (e.g. policing and judicial measures, blocking of financing, preventive detention, counter-insurgency campaigns and targeted air strikes), P/CVE is the use of non-coercive means to prevent or dissuade individuals or groups from adopting “extremist views” that might lead to acts of terrorism. P/CVE is thus intimately related to and part of States’ broader counter-terrorism agenda.
Terrorism remains a predominant and constantly evolving global threat. It undermines international peace and security, destroys the fabric of societies and creates chaos within entire regions. No country is immune from this threat. Social media, encrypted communications and the dark web are tools used to spread propaganda, radicalize new recruits and plan atrocities. Moreover, the military defeat of ISIL in Iraq and Syria in 2018 has allowed for the return of foreign terrorist fighters to our shores and theatres of conflict which exerts pressure on the global system to monitor these movements while simultaneously proffer solutions to this imminent issue. Clearly, terrorism is a transnational threat that cannot be defeated by any single government or organization, it requires a global, multilateral and multifaceted response. Thus, this necessitates understanding what is violent extremism and terrorism; examining the contributing factors towards its continued existence; and exploring ways of preventing, curbing and countering violent extremism and terrorism. These are the reasons which led to the convening by the University of the Southern Caribbean of this Conference entitled “Prioritising Caribbean Security in the 21st Century: Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Counter-Terrorism” on October 2-3 2019.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Summary of Guiding Principles for Countering Violent Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Strategies in the Caribbean.

Participants at the international conference in Maracas, St Joseph, Trinidad and Tobago focused on identifying principles that should be respected in developing, implementing and reviewing national and regional CVE and counter-terrorism strategies. Based on the foundation provided by the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, (adopted September 8, 2006) the UN Plan of Action to Preventing Violent Extremism (as presented by the UN Secretary General on 15 January 2016) and the CARICOM Counter-Terrorism Strategy (adopted at the Twenty-Ninth Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on February 26-27, 2018) the following overarching, substantive and procedural principles were acknowledged. In summary, participating officials from various governmental levels and agencies, regional and international organizations as well as civil society organizations agreed that national and regional countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism strategies are an effective tool to counter extremism and terrorism and are complementary to the Global Strategy.
A. National Countering Violent Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Strategies

With regard to national CVE and counter-terrorism strategies, participants touched upon the following principles that are essential in the development of comprehensive and integrated national strategies. Some of these principles relate to the substance of the national strategy, the process of its adoption, the mechanism of its implementation and the procedures for its evaluation. Those various principles are as follows:

1. Overarching Principles
   • The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy serves as a valuable blueprint, embraced by all Member States of the United Nations, in providing a comprehensive and integrated approach against terrorism. The Global Strategy’s four pillars (Addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; measures to prevent and combat terrorism; measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard; and measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism) underscore different and critical ways to prevent terrorism and extremism, suppress terrorist movements, financing and activities, build national institutional capacities and uphold respect for human rights and the rule of law.
   • In the development of national strategies, participants highlighted the importance of regional counter-terrorism frameworks, strategies and conventions. When national strategies are developed in conformity with regional strategies, the implementation of both the national and the regional strategies is facilitated. It was noted that for CARICOM Member States, that the CARICOM Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted at the Twenty-Ninth Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on February 26-27, 2018 and that more work had to be done in the individual member states.
   • Analysis of the terrorist threat is a key point of departure when developing national counter-terrorism strategies. The strategy and action plan should be context-specific and should respond to the threat perceived by the Trinidad and Tobago Government and other relevant stakeholders of society.
   • In the development and implementation of national strategies, national leadership and local ownership are important aspects.
   • The scope of a national strategy should be well defined. An effective strategy includes clearly defined and achievable objectives.
   • When developing national strategies, States should consider consulting other national and regional counter-terrorism strategies.
2. Substantive Principles

- Law enforcement agencies play an essential role in the development of national counter-terrorism strategies, primarily because they are often found at the forefront in analyzing the threat, identifying immediate responses and mobilizing the necessary resources.
- Addressing factors conducive to the spread of terrorism, including extremism, radicalization and terrorist recruitment, is an essential component for developing an integrated and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy.
- Any national strategy must rest on a multi-disciplinary approach. Terrorism is rooted in many aspects and any effective counter-terrorism strategy must integrate elements beyond the law enforcement infrastructure and include socio-economic, political, educational, developmental, human rights and rule of law dimensions.
- Countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism strategies should be premised on comprehensive national legislation, which takes into account universal counter-terrorism legal obligations.
- It is important that countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism responses are proportional to the threat and that responses are through a credible and independent criminal justice system.
- All national strategies should be in compliance with international human rights, humanitarian law and refugee law.

3. Procedural Principles

- A multidisciplinary counter-terrorism approach includes a variety of stakeholders. These stakeholders should include a range of governmental and non-governmental actors, as well as a broad partnership and consultations with them (such as with local communities, civil society organizations, academia, media and the private sector and humanitarian organizations.) Such stakeholders should be involved and integrated in the development of a national strategy from the beginning, and their participation should be sustained consistently throughout any strategy’s implementation.
- Concerning internal coordination, national strategies need to be accompanied by implementing mechanisms.
- There should be allocation of sufficient resources for the relevant agencies to carry out the tasks assigned to them in the implementation of the national strategy.
• Countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism coordinating bodies are important for coordinating counterterrorism policies and strategies that respond to national, regional and international threats. These bodies are also an excellent conduit to consolidate international, regional and national strategies.
• Coordination on the policy level should cascade downwards to the operational level. The operational coordination mechanism may vary and could focus on different themes, such as financing, investigations, law enforcement and border control.

• Evaluation of strategies would require regular monitoring or review of implementing mechanisms with a view to identifying strengths and weaknesses and the ability of those mechanisms to meet desired objectives.
• The evaluation process should be flexible enough to allow for meeting an evolving terrorist threat.

B. Regional Countering Violent Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Strategies
Participants identified the following overarching, substantive and procedural principles for the development and formulation, implementation as well as the review of regional countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism strategies.
1. Overarching Principles
The four pillars of the UN Global Strategy (I.Addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, II.Measures to prevent and combat terrorism, III.Measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard; and iv.Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism) as well as the four principles of the CARICOM Counter-Terrorism Strategy (I. Respect For Democratic Values. II. Protecting Human Rights And Respecting The Rule Of Law. III. Fostering Good Governance. IV. Fostering Mutual Respect And Tolerance Of Different Faiths And Beliefs) postulate two important sources of principles for the development of regional countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism strategies.
• As terrorist activities are rarely limited by territorial boundaries, the nature of the multifaceted threat of terrorism requires regional cooperation.
• Local ownership and tailored designs are necessary elements for the success of regional strategies. Regional mechanisms should reflect regional needs and realities to be effectively implemented on the regional and national level.
• Capacity building by regional organizations based on the UN Global Strategy’s pillars and the CARICOM Counter Terrorism four principles is useful and supports effective measures against terrorism and, hence, should be enhanced.
• The continuous comprehensive monitoring or review of regional strategies is crucial to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism activities.

2. Substantive Principles
• To effectively counter violent extremism and terrorism, it is necessary to conduct a holistic assessment that considers the conditions conducive to the threat of violent extremism and terrorism for the development of regional strategies.
• Trust building between regional partners through, for example, regional organizations is an essential requirement to foster lasting implementation of the strategies.
• Measures against violent extremism and terrorism based on regional strategies must respect human rights and the rule of law.
• Implementing mechanisms should target the conditions conducive to violent extremism and terrorism, focus on combating terrorism, design and implement capacity building programmes as well as respect human rights and the rule of law. Reforming and strengthening the criminal justice system should be considered in this regard.
• Regional collaboration mechanisms in the field of border management and security, the exchange of information, best practices and lessons learned are particularly beneficial to the countering of violent extremism and terrorism.
• Well-defined strategy objectives, including success indicators, are conducive to evaluation assessments. Independent evaluation, including by regional organizations, peer-review between countries of the region and self-evaluation are valuable complimentary mechanisms.
• Achievements might relate to the signing and / or ratification of regional legal framework conventions that might, for example, criminalize specific terrorist acts or improve law enforcement or judicial action against violent extremism and terrorism.

3. Procedural Principles
• The development of regional strategies requires a multidisciplinary, comprehensive and integrated approach taking into account all relevant national and regional stakeholders not limited to governmental actors in general and law enforcement or intelligence agencies in
particular. These stakeholders should include a range of governmental and non-governmental actors, as well as a broad partnership and consultations with them (such as with local communities, civil society organizations, academia, media and the private sector and humanitarian organizations). Stakeholders should be involved and integrated in the development of regional strategies from the beginning, and their participation should be sustained consistently throughout any strategy’s implementation.

- Pertinent civil society organizations should be involved, especially, but not only, with regard to the prevention of terrorism laid down in Pillar I and human rights and rule of law addressed in Pillar IV of the Global Strategy.
- Regional contact lists of national focal points should be created and well maintained. They can improve collaboration immensely.
- Inter-regional cooperation and sharing of experiences should be fostered, as it supports counter-terrorism efforts.
- Monitoring or review and evaluation of national strategies can take place on the regional level through the CARICOM and the OAS,, provided that all measures taken in this respect are respecting international law, including the protection and promotion of human rights and the rule of law.

THE WAY FORWARD. RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

With the technological advancement and changing narratives of globalization, terrorism has also undergone considerable transformation and it continues to evolve. Today, terror operatives and their groups are far more tech-savvy and globally connected, with an aim of achieving their goals through continuous innovation. The following recommendations were presented to deal with the threats currently faced by Trinidad and Tobago:

1. In keeping with the UN Plan of Action to prevent Violent Extremism as presented by the Secretary General on 15th January 2016, it was recommended that Trinidad and Tobago,, develop its own national plan of action to prevent violent extremism, with a focus on seven priority areas:
   i. Dialogue and conflict prevention,
   ii. Strengthening good governance, human rights and the rule of law,
   iii. Engaging communities, (especially Chaguanas, Rio Claro and Diego Martin, )
   iv. Empowering youth,
   v. Gender equality and empowering women,
vi. Education, skill development and employment facilitation,
vi. Strategic communications, including through the Internet and social media.

2. The need for systematic investments in local NGOs’ capacity and training in CVE, especially theories of change. There is a need to be aware also that funding from foreign sources like the USA and the UN in CVE programs may not always be sufficient in itself.
3. T&T government should work with foreign embassies, local NGOs, and local universities to quantitatively measure impact of existing programs.
4. Returning fighters and their families should take center stage and there must be a comprehensive policy to treat with them.
5. The development of a Plan of Action to treat with migration, illegal immigrants, human trafficking and refugees
6. The development of a Plan of Action to treat with Transnational Organised Crime and Narcoterrorism and Border Security
7. The development of an Effective Intelligence Gathering Capability and the establishment of a Fusion center to collectively combat crime, terrorism and national security issues
8. The creation of an Institute within the USC system on National Security, Terrorism and Intelligence and establishing MOUs and exchange of knowledge and personnel with other Universities, Global Entities and NGOs

**FIRST CONFERENCE DAY**

The introductory speeches pointed to the need of raising awareness and sharing knowledge on the complex issues of CVE and Terrorism. Multifaceted approaches and diversified strategies are required to tackle extremist discourse and prevent individuals at-risk from embracing violence as their preferred tool to promote change. The first session was chaired by Professor Leon Wilson, Provost of the University of the Southern Caribbean and featured the keynote address. The keynote address was by Professor Muqtedar Khan of the University of Delaware whose presentation was entitled “Shifting US Grand Strategy and its Impact on the Global War on Terror.” His presentation questioned the difficulty in defining CVE and made five points in relation to CVE:
1. CVE is the domestic dimension of war on terror.

2. The global war on terror involved waging war against terrorist groups, AQ & ISIS and states that support terrorism. (In US’ view).

3. While the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) sought to demolish/annihilate the radicals, CVE was designed to “prevent” radicalization, reverse radicalization and interrupt the process at home and counter extremist messaging and appeals.

4. The CVE model when exported and implemented in different countries abroad serves as the frontline against terrorism for the US in other nations.

5. CVE is part of GWOT and if the latter goes so will CVE.

He further discussed that the external strategic environment together with what is happening in the local context determine the Grand Strategy of the US and that it has changed over the years. He then identified the main components of the Grand Strategy for the periods: 1945-1989, 1989-2001, 2001-2006 and 2016 to the present (see table below).

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Table 1: Grand Strategy of the US – 1945-2016

He also re-evaluated the War on Terror from 2001-2016, in which the US identified the Axis of Evil-Iran, Iraq and North Korea. These three countries were seen by then US President GW Bush as sponsoring terrorism and seeking weapons of mass destruction. He argued that the global war on terror sought to promote and defend democracy and became the impetus for the rise of groups such as ISIS. This only reinforced the distrust and hatred that many Middle Eastern and other countries feel towards the US. Khan further stated that “In its narrowest sense, grand strategy is a statement of how military means can be used to accomplish national
or state goals in its foreign relations. In the broadest sense, it is something akin to a foreign policy vision, namely a country's roadmap for how it ought to manage its international interests and obligations." The U.S. grand strategy represents a set of questions and a method of deliberating upon them rather than a set of definitive answers. It is not quite clear that the United States has a grand strategy. Some lament this fact and suggest that if it was for the single purpose to animate the myriad tools at American policymakers' disposal—as containment did during the Cold War—American foreign policy would be more successful than it is. Others say that the United States, in fact, pursues a grand strategy - global domination" to its detractors, “liberal internationalism” or “the freedom agenda” to its promoters—albeit surreptitiously (and perhaps foolishly). Still others claim that the problem is not a deficiency of grand strategy but surplus of strategies.

The discussion among participants/attendees led to the conclusion that present American foreign policy is in a state of upheaval. The rise of Donald Trump and his rhetoric "America First" and "Make America Great Again" have created more uncertainty about America's role in the world than at any time in recent decades. From the South China Sea, to the Middle East, to the Baltics and Eastern Europe, the geopolitical challenges to U.S. power and influence seem increasingly tenuous —and America's responses to those challenges seem increasingly uncertain. Questions arise on the role the United States should play in the world and on the feasibility of America's continued pursuit of an assertive strategy in global affairs. Professor Khan addressed some of these concerns in his presentation by providing sharp yet nuanced assessments of the most critical issues in American grand strategy today. As such, several questions were raised but not limited to America's waning role and importance or not in the Post-Cold, the effectiveness of US grand strategy, the decline of internationalism in Donald Trump's administration, the nature of present American grand strategy and the military power America needs in the current international environment. For Khan, from 2016 onwards, America’s Grand Strategy was more a return to geopolitics with the goal of putting America first and that would include trade wars, hybrid wars, propaganda wars, de-globalization and old fashion great gamed politics. Under this grand strategy, Russia and China were seen as global challenges while North Korea and Iran were regional ones.

For him, there would be an increase in hybrid warfare and cyber-info terrorism and the two most pressing issues confronting the world are International migration and Climate challenges. He also indicated that the US has been undergoing a de-globalization process in the last two decades which involved four main facets:
1. Moving away from Multilateralism to Bilateralism. This will enable the US to always succeed since it is the strongest country and negotiating one to one with any other country will always give the US the upper hand.
2. Using Trade and not Aid as Leverage.
3. Practising Disengagement and not Engagement as Driver.
4. Disrupting not Constructing Global Liberal Order (Brexit).

Quoting an extract from Time magazine, Khan also focused on the statement that “We are being eaten from within.” Why America is losing the battle against white nationalist terrorism. (Time. August 8, 2019). Commenting on the Time magazine article, Khan stated it was clear that white nationalists have become the face of terrorism in America. Since 9/11, white supremacists and other far-right extremists have been responsible for almost three times as many attacks on U.S. soil as Islamic terrorists, the government reported. According to a 2019 study by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), from 2009 through 2018, the far right has been responsible for 73% of domestic extremist-related fatalities and the figure is growing. More people – 49 –were murdered by far-right extremists in the U.S. in 2018 than in any other year since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. FBI Director Christopher Wray told Congress in July that a majority of the bureau’s domestic-terrorism investigations since October were linked to white supremacy. Khan further stated that right-wing terrorism is a global problem and can have devastating consequences as seen in the attacks on New Zealand and Norway. Right-wing terrorism is particularly dangerous in the U.S. which has more guns per capita than anywhere else in the world. The latter would only grow in face of increased mass shootings, hateful ideologies and existent laws which makes it very difficult to confront a disaggregated movement that exists largely in the shadows of cyberspace.

SESSION A: Violent Extremism and Counter Violent Extremism
This session was chaired by Mr. Keron Ganpat and there were four panelists. The first speaker was Attorney-at-Law Vyana Sharma whose contribution focused on Combatting Terrorism: Legislative Interventions on the Anti-Terrorism Act, Foreign Terrorist Fighters and International Obligations in Relation to Combatting Terrorism and Confiscation of Terrorist Property and Risk of NPO Abuse. Ms. Sharma indicated that an evolving approach to combatting and preventing terrorism is needed in order to defeat the terrorists who threaten the safety of Trinidad and Tobago citizenry, prevent future attacks, and protect its national interests. It was acknowledged that Trinidad and Tobago
has the largest number of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) per capita who have joined Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This movement began around 2013 when Trinidad and Tobago nationals the flow of FTF migrating to the Caliphate to join ISIS. It was also stated though that not everyone went with the intention of becoming a fighter, others wanted to live in the type of state that ISIL was marketing. In this regard, preventing terrorists, including FTFs, from exploiting the global financial system is a key priority for the Government of T&T.

Ms. Sharma explained that the Financial Intelligence Unit of Trinidad and Tobago (FIUTT) supports this objective by identifying and making available relevant Suspicious Transaction Reports or Suspicious Activity Reports (STRs/SARs) to appropriate investigative authorities, sharing information with foreign FIUs and administering the regime under the Anti-Terrorism Act, Chap 12:07. Citing statistics from 2011 to 2019, the value of STRs/SARs from 2011-2016 accounted for TT$4.5Bn; in 2017 there were 877 transactions which accounted for TT$22.05Bn while in 2018 there were 1100 transactions which accounted for TT$981,741, 403. In regard to the sources of terrorist financing she identified five main areas: Private Donations, Abuse/Misuse of Non-Profit Organizations, Proceeds of Criminal Activity, Legitimate Commercial Enterprises and Self-Funding.

LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTIONS: The issue of terrorism has held international attention for the last few years, even though it has existed for decades. The actions of Al Qaida in attacking the World Trade Centre in 2001 catapulted this issue and emphasized the importance of political, military and law enforcement attention on this threat. Citing Gailon Lawson, from Trinidad and Tobago who recently (March 2019) posed for a portrait at Al-Hol camp in Hasskeh Province, Ms Sharma stated that Ms. Lawson, 45, said she began to regret her decision even before she reached the “caliphate.” The night she crossed into Syria in 2014, people had to dash across in the darkness to evade Turkish border guards. “I saw people running, and that's when I realised it was a mistake,” she said. Unfortunately, Ms. Lawson is just one among tens of thousands of ISIS family members, mostly women and children, who are currently crammed into squalid camps overseen by the US-backed Kurdish-led forces who spearheaded the fight against the extremist group.

Ms. Lawson’s situation provides a case for legitimate intervention. At the time, she was a recent convert to Islam who had become the second wife of a man, also a T&T national, who apparently had been radicalised. Days after they married, they travelled to Syria. “I
just followed my husband," she said. They divorced not long after arriving. Lawson’s biggest concern over the next few years was keeping her son from being enlisted as a fighter. She was arrested three times by ISIS for refusing conscription. She argued that there are several different dimensions and risks in respect of terrorism, especially with the foreign terrorist fighter (or FTF) trend and that this has created a multiplicity of possible subjects for intelligence and law enforcement agencies including:

1. T&T foreign terrorist fighters returning home or homegrown terrorists who never left;
2. FTFs from other countries intending to attack targets in our country or transiting through T&T on their way to another country to commit acts of terrorism;
3. The risk of terrorism and crime posed by children who were traumatized while in conflict zones;
4. The persons who orchestrate and support terrorist acts by planning, recruiting, training and financing.

*International Obligations in relation to Combatting Terrorism*

According to Ms. Sharma, Trinidad and Tobago has an obligation to fulfil the requirements established by the United Nations via the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions and as set out in the Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force. She further stated that UNSC Resolution 1267 made it mandatory that States shall deny permission for any aircraft to take off from or land in their territory if it is owned, leased or operated by or on behalf of the Taliban as designated by the Committee; and shall freeze funds and other financial resources. While this resolution requires international cooperation, it also calls upon States to bring proceedings against persons and entities within their jurisdiction that violate the measures imposed therein. She then identified UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001) as the resolution deals with the prevention and suppression of terrorist financing, providing domestic listings, and providing assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings and preventing the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups. Ms Sharma then discussed the FATF recommendations 5 & 6 which require states to criminalize terrorism and terrorist financing and reinforces the principles established in UNSCRs 1267 and 1373.
The second presenter was **Imam Sheraz Ali** who discussed “The role of Imams in Trinidad mosques and Radicalization” which examined local Imams in Trinidad and Tobago and their possible involvement/connection to local followers joining radicalized movements in foreign lands. He began by defining who is an Imam and listed the prerequisites for Imamate which means "leadership" and refers to the office of an imam or a state ruled by an imam. He then identified the selection and various responsibilities of an Imam. Citing historical data and information, he spoke of the early development of mosques in Trinidad in 1863 and of the building of schools for Muslims, the first one being in 1949. He then traced the social and economic development of the Muslim community in Trinidad with the formation of several Islamic groups, the creation of Islamic television stations, engagement with both government and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the rapid construction of masjids throughout Trinidad. He further stated that Imams needed to become more educated about the Quran, hadith and the ideologies of Islam. In so doing, Imams would better understand the dynamic and influential role they can play by offering counter-narratives to terrorist ideologies. This comment is based on a survey he conducted recently with several Imams throughout Trinidad which led to the conclusion that generally Imams do not support violence. Based on his knowledge, it was only about 3% of Imams who had encouraged or were influential in getting their followers to travel to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS. His emphasis is to impress upon all Imams to do more to guide their followers and stave off movements and opportunities for followers to join terrorist organizations.

The third speaker was the High Commissioner of India to Trinidad **H.E. Arun Kumar Sahu** who spoke on the Relevance of Gandhi in Contemporary World. He spoke about Gandhi’s message of non-violence (ahimsa) and the idea of non-violent resistance (satyagraha). He indicated that Gandhi held that violence was wrong as a matter of principle and countering violence with violence is obviously wrong. This only adds to the evil already in existence. Therefore, violence must first be fought by persuasion and when persuasion fails, one must resort to non-violent resistance. Critics very often fail to understand that non-violent resistance according to Gandhi is also a ‘force’ which is different from violence. The two words ‘violence’ and ‘force’ are often used interchangeably so that we fail to understand that force need not always be violent. For Gandhi, non-violent resistance is a means of countering the force that is violent. Gandhi would have nothing to do with either the organized violence of the Government or with the unorganized violence of the people. For him, popular violence is as much an obstruction in our path as state sponsored violence. He objected to violence because it only brings a
temporary and impermanent good. Gandhi dismissed terrorist violence and felt that if one man kills another who obstructs him, he may experience a sense of false security which will be short lived. Terrorist violence could never do any good in the long run.¹ Gandhi did not deny credit to revolutionary heroism and sacrifice. But heroism and sacrifice for a bad cause was seen as a waste of splendid energy that hurt the good cause by drawing away attention from it.² Gandhi said, "I am not ashamed to stand erect before the heroic and self-sacrificing revolutionary because I am able to pit an equal measure of non-violent men (Satyagrahis); heroism and sacrifice untarnished by the blood of the innocent. Self-sacrifice of one innocent man is a million times more potent than the sacrifice of a million men who die in the act of killing others."³ He also observed that "at the back of the policy of terrorism is the assumption that terrorism if applied in a sufficient measure will produce the desired result, namely, bend the adversary to the tyrant's will. But such is not always the case.

The fourth speaker was Dr Malisa Neptune-Figaro who presented on the topic “Exploring the relationship between Trinbagonians and Violent Islamic Extremism: A Closer Look at the Impact of the Social Context on Citizen’s Involvement in ISIS”. Dr. Neptune-Figaro stated that Trinidad and Tobago nationals have been under intense media scrutiny for their supposed links to ISIS and their involvement in violent extremist activities at home and abroad (Country Reports on Terrorism 2017; Global Terrorism Index 2017; Graham-Harrison & Surtees, 2018; Houck, 2018). This was a result of the country being reported as having the highest number of persons per capita joining ISIS in the Western Hemisphere. As contemporary studies continued to document ISIS recruitment process, the Trinidad and Tobago government, along with several academic researchers, were interested in understanding the reason(s) for Trinbagonian nationals and other FTFs seeking to join ISIS. Internationally, some research pointed to the Islamic ideology as a key reason for mass migration to the Middle East and a fundamental reason for participation in political violence (Sageman, 2014). She noted that while most Muslims promoted peace, some Muslims believed in Holy war, commonly known as Jihad. More popularly, the Salafi-Jihadist Muslim ideology has been the cornerstone of violent extremism and Marc Sageman (2014) found that jihad played a significant role in the decision to go to the Islamic State. The compelling arguments that religious ideology influenced travels seem multifaceted. Drawing from these arguments, two key explanations for local travels to the Islamic State and joining other Islamist fighting “holy war” have emerged:
First, researchers argued that an important motivating factor for citizens’ journeying to the Islamic State was to achieve religious freedom beyond the shores of Trinidad and Tobago (McCoy and Knight, 2017; Badri-Maharaj, 2016).
Second, researchers demonstrated that obedience to a specific part of the Quran regarding the Islamic State is another key reason for travels to Syria and Iraq. In the Quran it stated that once the Islamic State or caliphate is formed, true Muslims must migrate to that state (Pew Research Center Report, 2013; Sageman, 2014).

Noting that global research on FTFs has been somewhat vague and contradictory about the role that socio-economic factors play in motivating travel to ISIS, while some researchers argued that social conditions and financial concerns minimally contributed to the decision to participate in violent extremism (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002; Krueger, 2007; Mercy Corps Policy Brief, 2015), other scholars believed that the recent wave of FTFs seemingly migrated to ISIS because of the lack of economic opportunity and relative deprivation (Gassebner &Luechinger, 2011; Matel, 2013). Financial rewards have always been an important aspect of the ISIS propaganda to motivate individuals, particularly youths to travel to Syria (Matel, 2013). Local social scientists have put forward this perspective to explain the reason for citizens’ support of ISIS. Based on her findings, she proposed the following:

- In-depth investigations be directed towards those who attempted to enter Syria and were denied. These individuals may be capable of spreading radical ideologies among locals because they were not able to contribute fully to the ISIS cause. For this reason, these ISIS enthusiasts may incite local extremist activities to compensate for their inability to fight alongside ISIS.
- There should be more emphasis on creating wider networks and information sharing with regional and international agencies. The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service mentioned that it was difficult to retrieve information from international agencies on local travels to Iraq and Syria. As a result, greater focus should be placed on forging relationships with international agencies that can provide essential information.
- Meeting with Muslim leaders should be a priority. The participants of the interview believed that these individuals have valuable information that can assist officials curb extremism and divert young Muslims away from violent extremism.
- Monitoring, regulating and prohibiting extremist websites and chat rooms is important in preventing some extremist information from reaching vulnerable populations. While this may not entirely solve radicalism, it can help reduce international influence on locals.
- More resources should be allotted for research in this area. Empirical evidence on the local extremism is limited and further investigations are necessary to confront this ongoing issue.

SESSION B: YOUTH, WOMEN & CVE

This session was chaired by Dr. Wnada Chesney and featured three panelists.

Dr. Myrna Cintron presented a paper “Patterns of Radicalization of Youth in the United States” which shows children are not as culpable as adults for their behaviors. She noted that Neuroscience research into adolescent brain development indicates the brains of those over the
age of 18 continue to physically change in ways related to capability for criminal offenses and further indicates that during adolescence delinquency and risk behaviors are likely to increase. Citing data she showed that between 2002 and 2019 there were 235 reported incidents of extremist murders in the U.S. Citing literature on brain development and behavior, it was shown how brain and developmental research offer new ways to understand differences between adolescents and fully matured adults. This understanding clarifies what parents, teachers, and those that deal with children have known and described for generations. Social science research also indicates that adolescence is a period where people are trying to figure out who they are, and one way is by identifying with a group. How one identifies with a group may impact responses and shapes views due to group identification. This suggests that by belonging to a group, individuals engage in a process of transitioning from the individual self to group identity or group membership (Mackie, Smith and Ray, 2008). It is also within a group that members develop the capacity to distinguish significant meaning in attitude and beliefs associated with the group. While we are all affiliated to multiple groups (i.e., professional, fraternities, ethnic, class or sociopolitical), some groups hold more weight and more importance than others, and it is those groups that appear to have a greater impact on our emotional connection.

The research also showed that while political motivations are at the root of terrorist acts, the U.S. is more likely to suffer victimization from mass shootings associated with the political ideologies of conservatism, and right-wing beliefs. Mass shootings have also been attributed to racists, nationalists, environmentalists, and Islamic terrorists. Given recent lethal attacks in the U.S., it is important to understand the factors that motivate such behavior. Already in 2019, the Gun Violence Archive, a nonprofit group that tracks shootings in the US, has counted 255 mass shootings. The organization defines a mass shooting as a single incident in which at least four people are shot not including the gunman. It should be clarified that the mass shooting definition has been systematically accepted by government agencies as well as researchers and media outlets. It should also be stated that discussions in the U.S. have centered on gun violence, gun control, and mental health. While mass shootings instill fear and terrorize citizens; public discussions have avoided the use of the word terrorism and terrorists. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) conceptualized a pathway to violence that utilizes twelve constructs or mechanisms of radicalization at the individual, group, and mass-public levels. The authors conceptualize radicalization as a dimension of increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in support of intergroup conflict and violence. These are illustrated in Table 2.
Mike McCauley and Moskalenko (2008), the authors of this paper consider that individual radicalization involves the increased commitment of time, money, risk-taking, and violence in support of a group ideal, idea, or political cause. Those individuals with strong commitment will have higher group identification, and willingness to fight for what the group stands for. “Individuals are radicalized by personal grievances, and by identify-group grievances as conveyed by mass media, rumor, or the testimony of others. Individuals are also radicalized as members of small face-to-face groups” (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008: 417-418). She recommended Do the hard work of addressing the root of the problem: alienation, marginalization that can make extremists more attractive. Interventions early enough to stop radicalization and limit access to firearms.

Dr Ashaki L Dore followed and presented a paper entitled “Gang Imitation, Youth Radicalization and Violent Extremism.” She defined radicalization from different perspectives seeing it as having extremist ideologies and beliefs which has been fostered by economic marginalization, identity problems, increasing violent, deprivation, and breakdown in mental health, family life and community. In looking at the way forward, she stated that both government and civil society should be prepared to engage the at risk/hot spot communities through survey and qualitative research to ascertain their views regarding their role (active or
passive) in providing the enabling structures and conditions for the growth and expansion of
gangs and to inform policy development which goes beyond punishing/rehabilitating the
individual perpetrators. She also argued that the community must be viewed as an enabling
structure, a radical milieu, the black hole which create the conditions for growth and expansion.
As such, the community must be involved in the fight against crime (gang/terrorism/extremism),
if there is to be any impact on criminality in Trinidad and Tobago.

The final presenter was Dr Raghunath Mahabir who presented a paper on “Migration, Violent
Extremism and Gang Violence.” He stated that the International Organization for Migration
(IOM) defines a migrant as any person who is moving or has moved across an
international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless
of the person’s legal status; whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; what the causes
for the movement are; or what the length of the stay is. “Violent Extremism describes the beliefs
and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or
political goals. This includes terrorism, other forms of politically motivated violence and some
forms of communal violence. All forms of violent extremism, no matter what their motivation,
seek change through fear and intimidation rather than constructive democratic processes. It is
important that the ideology behind VE be clearly understood and challenged. There are few
stand-alone definitions of VE in the literature. The term is more often used in conjunction with
those pertaining to radicalization and terrorism. The amalgamation of these terms and the lack
of a single working definition of VE present a number of prevailing issues. These include our
inability to truly understand and challenge its basis, as well as apprehend how it should be
treated within legal frameworks and judicial systems.

Violent Extremism describes the beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to
achieve ideological, religious or political goals. This includes terrorism, other forms of politically
motivated violence and some forms of communal violence. All forms of violent extremism, no
matter what their motivation, seek change through fear and intimidation rather than
constructive democratic processes.” Gang violence means criminal and non-political acts of
violence committed by a group of people who regularly engage in criminal activity against
innocent people. The term may also refer to physical hostile interactions between two or more
gangs. The term gang refers to two or more people organized to achieve a common objective
and who share a common identity. Gangs identify themselves with a common name or sign.
The escalating economic, political and humanitarian crises in Venezuela has forced at least 4
million people to flee the country, most of them since 2015. (UNHCR, 2018). Trinidad and
Tobago hosts at least 40,000 of these migrants, who have either crossed the border illegally and remain in the country or others who came in legally and over stayed.

Evidence indicate that for Trinidad and Tobago, the highest numbers of Venezuelans coming to Trinidad were during the period January 2018 to June 2019. According to an Immigration official, at least 35,000 Venezuelans went to Trinidad during that period. (Interview with Immigration Officer). For more than a century, innumerable studies have confirmed two simple yet powerful truths about the relationship between immigration and crime: immigrants are less likely to commit serious crimes or be behind bars than the native-born, and high rates of immigration are associated with lower rates of violent crime and property crime.

This holds true for both legal immigrants and the unauthorized, regardless of their country of origin or level of education. In other words, the overwhelming majority of immigrants are not “criminals” by any commonly accepted definition of the term. For this reason, harsh immigration policies are not effective in fighting crime. Unfortunately, immigration policy is frequently shaped more by fear and stereotype than by empirical evidence. Within recent months, there have been numerous newspapers articles in Trinidad and Tobago citing a nexus between Venezuelan migrants and crime. The following are a few examples.

- **According to Attorney General Faris Al-Rawi, T&T is grappling with economic migrants since Venezuelans began to seek refuge here and it is a fact that the country has seen an uptick in “certain of the crimes” as result of some of the migrant issues.** (Trinidad Guardian, June 11,2019).

- **In Trinidad and Tobago, extremism can be seen the vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and respect and tolerance for different faiths and beliefs.** We also regard calls for the death of members of our armed forces as extremist.

- **Although when we speak of extremism, it has in most cases been linked to issues of Islamic radicalization and Islamic extremism, in many cases, extremist behavior had nothing to do with Islam itself and some people who display extremist views and behavior have no connection with Islam.** It’s important to remember that not all extremist groups, whether Islamist, far-right or other, will commit terrorist or violent acts.

Dr Mahabir noted that Mark Stainbrook has presented a list of ten motivating factors for joining a gang or a terrorist group. He noted that, in most cases, no single element is the sole factor. Rather, it is typically the sum of several motivators that tips the scale. Nine of the
motivators he presented were shared between gang members and members of terrorist groups: camaraderie, identity, family or social network, family disruption, excitement or thrill, social pressure, protection, racism and discrimination, and satisfying material needs. He explained that the only motivating factor that seems exclusive to people who join terrorist groups, as opposed to those who join gangs, is ideological and/or religious justification. In terms of gang involvement despite all the rhetoric being circulated about Venezuelan gangs and their role on the local scene, no Venezuelan has been charged under the Anti-gang legislation. The much anticipated confrontations with the Evande gang and others have not materialized due to among other things, the threat was never real to Trinidad and Tobago and the effective intelligence and operations from the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service. In terms of violent extremism, while it has been rumored that Venezuelans have been indoctrinated by some Muslim groups after they render assistance to the migrants, there is no evidence available to show that Venezuelans are willing to work with radical elements in Trinidad and Tobago to destabilize the country in any way.

POLICY RESPONSES TO MIGRATION:
On the basis of this preliminary analysis, the following seven implications for policy debate may be offered:

1. Closer dialogue is required between policymakers responsible for migration and those charged with preventing violent extremism; this is a particular challenge as the latter are variously located in security and development agencies, with internal as well as external mandates;
2. A better analytical framework, based on better definitions, more comprehensive data and empirical evidence is required, in order to support more rigorous analysis and inform policy;
3. While the evidence on the risk of infiltration by terrorist groups is currently slim, it is necessary to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of migration management and inter-State collaboration, including via appropriate pre-screening of candidates for refugee resettlement and migration, enhanced intelligence-sharing among governments and the appropriate usage of biometrics;
4. A more integrated approach to tackling the causes of displacement and migration should include interventions specifically focused on countering and preventing violent extremism – there is growing evidence that preventing violent extremism may be one way to address the drivers of migration;
5. Greater efforts may be required to guard against the risk of radicalization across all displacement conditions, including in refugee and transit camps, with an emphasis on providing education, access to work, and, where possible, greater freedom of movement;
6. More effective integration and social inclusion policies are required to reduce social exclusion and the risk of radicalization to violent extremist agendas amongst migrants and their descendants;
7. It is important not to undermine migration or refugee policy by focusing too much on preventing violent extremism agendas, for example by ensuring that PVE interventions respect the rights of migrants and refugees.

Well-managed migration can promote mutual understanding; migration also has significant impacts on poverty reduction in countries of origin through remittances, reducing the appeal of violent extremism. Migration is a symbol of the hard-won principles of openness and globalization that violent extremism seeks to overturn and that therefore should be protected. The challenge for policymakers is to promote the positive aspects of migration, rather than merely focusing on the low potential risk of importing violent extremists when offering opportunities to migrants and protection to refugees.

**SECOND CONFERENCE DAY**

The first session was chaired by Dr. Edward Clarke, Lecturer, University of the Southern Caribbean and featured the keynote address. The keynote address was delivered by Professor Simon Cottee of the University of Kent who presented on the Calypso Caliphate. He emphasized the need to answer the following questions in the local context:

1. Who are the Trinis who left to join ISIS?
2. Why and how did they leave and join?
3. What should be done about those who remain in detention in Syria and Iraq?
4. What (if anything) should be done to counter violent extremism in T&T?
5. Did the Trini women who took their children to Iraq or Syria intend to enlist their children into ISIS’s machinery of war and sexual servitude?

Dr Cottee then provided some demographics data on Trini ISIS travellers noting that 34% are male, 23% are female, and 43% are minors.; of the adults, the ratio of males to females is 60:40; the average age at time of departure across all of the adults is 34; with the exception of the women, nearly all were employed at the time of leaving; and the vast majority—90%—can be categorized as middle class, while 10% can be categorized as lower class.

Among the men, nearly 80% were married at the time of leaving, while among the women all were married. 43% are converts. 30% had a criminal record or had been involved in criminal activities prior to their departure. The vast majority of those who left come from three areas in Trinidad: **Rio Claro** in the south-east, **Chaguanas** in west-central Trinidad and **Diego Martin** in the north-west. He also noted that just 2 women, 1 man, 2 boys and 2 teenaged girls have returned to Trinidad from Syria and Iraq.; there are likely more than **60** Trini minors currently in detention in Syria and Iraq; and according to “Concerned Muslims of T&T”, there are **40** children and **16** women in the Al-Hol camp in north-eastern Syria alone.
As stated by Cottee, The United Nations Protocol on human trafficking defines it as [quote] “the recruitment or receipt of persons...for the purpose of exploitation.” Under the Protocol, exploitation includes, “sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery...” In the case of child trafficking, only the act of recruitment and intent to exploit are relevant. CVE is a form of government-sponsored non-coercive intervention in the so-called “pre-crime” space. He also noted that the main goals of CVE are to prevent people from embracing “extremist” beliefs that justify violence and to persuade people who already actively support terrorist groups (but who do not break the law) to abandon this support.

**SESSION A: MEDIA, CIVIL SOCIETY & EDUCATION IN CVE**

This session was chaired by Pastor Terrence Brown and there were four panelists. The first speaker was **Professor Yufei Wu** who presented on *Fake Elections: Cyber Attacks in the Elections System*. He reminded the audience that prior to the 2016 Federal Elections a series of cyber-attacks occurred on information systems of state and local election jurisdictions. Subsequently in January 2017 the Department of Homeland Security designated the election infrastructure used in federal elections as a component of US critical infrastructure. He spoke of attack vectors which included Technical Political and Psychological (online Propaganda).

Four Techniques of Cyber Meddling Elections:

1. Cyber Attacks on Systems and Databases
2. Misinformation Campaign
3. Micro-targeted Manipulation
4. Trolling

Cyber Attacks on Systems and Databases: Copying and leaking data threatens its confidentiality; Deleting or manipulating violates its integrity; and Encryption or network disruption can change its availability. One of the threats to election integrity is the possibility of data breaches of voting machines, voter lists, or other databases and systems that are integral to the voting process itself.

Example:

Hacking the Democratic National Party (United States, 2016):
The DNC leak consisted of hacked data from seven key members of the DNC: nearly 20,000 emails with over 8,000 attachments have been leaked, all written between January 2015 and May 2016. The hacked emails were first released via dcleaks.com, and later by WikiLeaks.

The organization, timing and promotion of the DNC leaks maximized the reputational harm to the Democratic Party at a key moment in the 2016 campaign.

Example:

Macron Leak (France, 2017):

Two days before the final round of the 2017 French presidential elections, a trove of emails and documents that allegedly belonged to the campaign team of candidate Emmanuel Macron was released online.

Links to the stolen data were propagated by a hashtag campaign, #MacronLeaks, which appears to have been heavily promoted by individuals and bots associated with right-wing or pro-Russia operations.

DIGITAL MISINFORMATION:

FAKE NEWS, DEEP FAKE, AND COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA:

The use of algorithms, automation, and human curation to purposefully distribute misleading information over social media networks.

Bots are algorithmically driven computer programs designed to do specific tasks online.

Sock puppets are human-operated fake accounts.

Sock puppets can be used to make messages more credible, such as by impersonating a trusted source make it appear that particular people or groups are spreading messages or hold opinions that they do not.

Multiple fake accounts can also be used to amplify.

Example:

Fake News in the 2016 US Election:

2016 US election generated extraordinary amounts of fake news.

In the last months of the election, the top 20 fake news pieces had greater engagement on Facebook than the top 20 stories from major news outlets.

In late 2017, it was revealed that Russian actors purchased political ads and used fake identities to post fake stories on Facebook and other social media platforms.

False stories on Facebook – such as the Pope endorsing Trump – were more likely to benefit Trump and the Republican Party rather than Clinton and the Democratic Party.

Example:
Bots and the 2017 French Election.

Hundreds of social media accounts – including many that were active during the 2016 US election – promoted false and defamatory information, primarily against candidate Emmanuel Macron.

These accounts were particularly active in the final days of the election, when they promoted the possible leak of Macron campaign documents.

MANIPULATING PREFERENCES VIA BIG DATA AND MICRO-TARGETING:

Algorithms are used to rapidly sift through these massive amounts of data to identify relevant sub-populations that may be targeted.

Algorithms can identify people based on demographics, geography, psychographics, behavior, and combinations of each of these categories.

**Manipulation may be easier with micro-targeting for several reasons.**

First, messages can be designed to exploit specific cognitive dispositions and information deficits. Second, micro-targeting allows actors to target specific groups (or individuals), and to precisely control the timing, information, and sites of contact, so that they leverage psychological predispositions or vulnerabilities for maximum effect. Third, micro-targeted messages are usually only seen by targeted audiences, limiting possibilities for critique or counterargument. Finally, micro-targeting could be used to identify and mobilize potentially dangerous individuals or groups within a political community, targeted at specific groups or individuals to incite backlash or even violence.

The second presenter was Dr. Georgina Chami who presented on Social Media mediating in Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism. Dr. Chami acknowledged that in recent years, the use of the Internet by violent extremists is seen as a tool of spreading propaganda, raising funds, recruiting members, and communicating with activists has expanded exponentially. The issue of how to limit terrorist use of the Internet has been discussed for some time. Much of the debate has centred on government’s intervention through censorship, monitoring and counter-propaganda programs, or allowing the free flow of traffic on the Internet in order to support democratic values such as freedom of expression. Dr. Chami further pointed out that what has become increasingly apparent is preventing and tackling radicalization leading to terrorism and violent extremism is a security issue and about addressing public opinion and refuting and challenging extremist ideologies.
Strategic communications that provide counter-narratives to terrorist propaganda is one means of countering violent extremism. Online and social media are particularly useful in the dissemination of counter narratives in multiple languages, to reach a broad, geographically diverse audience. Counter-Narrative campaigns encompass a wide range of communication activities including: public diplomacy, strategic communications by governments and targeted campaigns. These activities are designed to:

- raise awareness in communities and foster key relationships between government and communities,
- discredit the ideologies and actions of violent extremists,
- offer alternative narratives focusing on positive engagement
- directly counter violent extremist messaging & info for advancement of terrorist purposes.

Most importantly is the creation of specific unit to tackle and address this issue. This would allow for the organization, proper planning and coordination of ideas, initiatives and implementation of programmes on the area of CVE. Equally important is Digital literacy - enhancing public digital literacy & helping the citizenry to be critical of what they see and read both online and offline. Disseminate online & offline information that challenge extremist narratives via forums, social media platforms. Support/assist CSOs and credible individuals to provide believable alternatives to VE online. By empowering people to become proactive and critical consumers of information, communities will be able to limit violent extremist narrative and recruitment within the community.

This discourse highlighted the importance of social media and how it could be used as tool for countering violent extremism. Other recommendations going forward include a three-pillared strategy for the implementation of online counter-narratives: message, messengers and media. Counter narratives must create doubt among at risk communities to VE & offer feasible alternative approaches. Each counter narrative should be specific to context – one size fits all is not appropriate. Long-term project and cannot expect overnight results – sustained efforts are most effective. Campaigns should be compelling and professionally produced as possible. Counter Narratives are done both online and offline.

**Mr Fazal Karim MP** spoke about the role of education in preventing/countering violent extremism. Citing examples that he has used in his constituency of Chaguanas East.. He identified that in recent periods, the role of education in preventing and countering violent extremism (PVE/CVE) has been given increased attention by policy makers and practitioners of security. Explaining further, he emphasizes that so long as quality education, effective education
policies and interventions with the specific goal of countering violent extremism can be focused on communities where youth are vulnerable to violent extremism and specifically tailored to fit the local context. If achievable, only then can education drive truthful narratives as a powerful tool to PVE and CVE.

Describing the context in which his research brings insight, he describes Trinidad and Tobago as experiencing economic challenges due to inter-alia decline in oil prices globally and corruption. While the government works aggressively to curb and combat crime and VE, he argues that deteriorated socio-economic conditions has contributed to the spiral in crime of all types and an increase in violent extremism (VE) recruitment.

Drawing reference to a National Geographic Documentary as well as global media companies including local media company CNC3, his concern was that global media have all accepted that the country is currently labeled as the highest per capita rate of Islamic State of Iraq & Syria (ISIS) recruits in the western hemisphere.

His presentation covered in depth areas such as personal significance, VE groups social engagement, intellectual religious dialogue and education during indoctrination are critical parts of VE groups recruitment process. He noted that extremists groups and charismatic leaders exploit the minds of at-risk individuals through educational mechanisms such as social media, circulations of print media and the of declarations of fatwas by VE leaders. Conversely, he asserted that education is an indispensable component to counter the narrative of such misinterpreted ideologies and correct the psychological path in the quest for peace and by extension peaceful improvements in society. His discussion reviewed globally accepted best practices and presented an understanding of the definition of education, its role and challenges in society and its importance in deradicalization and counter-narration in at-risk communities.

Professor Daniel Aldrich presented on Countering Violence Extremism in Trinidad. He started by noting that strong social ties reduce all kinds of crime and that there are two types of responses to shocks, (1) Hard response which is top down, state-centered, visible, evokes an immediate response and impact and a Soft response which is often bottom up, market- or civil society-based, harder to see and evokes a slower response and impact. Citing examples from several African countries in the Maghreb and the Sahel he showed that in close knitted communities the move towards extremism was very slow and examined the need for societies like Trinidad to be close knitted.

In looking at Radicalization Factors, Professor Aldrich noted that observers of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) have moved beyond simplistic and common arguments seeking to
Connect economic conditions, such as poverty, to outcomes such as support for or recruitment to VEOs. While many initial attempts at understanding terrorism argued that participants came from impoverished backgrounds, little evidence has supported these claims. Instead, scholars and governments have recognized a wide variety of paths to extremism, many of them tied into the political environment and extended social networks, and have categorized them into push and pull factors.

Push factors were identified as those which involved conditions that help spread support for violent extremism. These are “the negative social, cultural, and of one’s societal environment that aid in pushing vulnerable individuals onto the path of violent extremism.” Common push factors include government repression, corruption, elite impunity, and poorly governed areas. For example, in Kenya, “the war against Al-Shabaab has led to an increase in ethnic profiling and discrimination against Somalis in particular, and Muslims in general.” As a result of ethnic profiling, both Somalis and Muslims may have felt more sympathy or even support for terror groups because of government actions against their communities.

So too broad scale raids of heavily Muslim-occupied neighborhoods by authorities in Trinidad and Tobago may reinforce grievance narratives already being narrated by violent extremist groups. After the US Embassy received information from a local informant that there was a plot to destabilize the Carnival, Trinidadian security officers executed broad arrests in certain communities.

Pull factors in contrast come from events and the characteristics of the potential supporters and recruits themselves. These include access to material support, the potential for adventure and esteem, and the possibility of self-empowerment through radicalization (USAID 2011). Pull factors also may come via charismatic leaders, the need to answer a spiritual calling and messages of defending Islam from invaders. In one case, a Sahel-based VEO provided financial support to would-be members.

Rather than being seen as a linear progression, scholars have argued that recruitment and radicalization need not proceed in lock step and may need a trigger moment to push radicalized members to violent action. Trinidad and Tobago has a number of conditions which operate as push and pull factors, and it is worth exploring these historically in detail.

Aldrich noted that in post-independence Trinidad, Muslims made contact with the Arab world and many Muslim youths went to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Libya to study Islamic theology and Arabic. This created a better understanding among some but also confusion and tensions within the Indo-Muslim community as it sought to delegitimise South Asian Islam as ‘cultural
Islam’ and brough innovations (such as taazeem, niyaz, and qaseedas) to validate Sunnification and/or greater orthodoxy back home. In the 1970s with the development of the global Black Power Movement black Muslims in Trinidad and Tobago began to formally identify themselves as belonging to particular Islamic movements such as the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen. Today, the Jamaat Al Muslimeen has multiple offshoots in Trinidad and Tobago, including Wajihatul Islamiyyah, Jamaat al-Murabiteen and Jamaat al-Islami al-Karibi, all of which have ideologies similar to militant black ethno-nationalist movements. As one long time resident told us, “In the days when the Ladies’ group was vibrant, you had people together and activities flourishing, but then you had divisions and confusion. The late 1970s and early 1980s was the pinnacle of the division and 19990 saw the first Islamic attempted coup in Trinidad and Tobago by the Jamaat –al-Muslimeen (JAM).

He also noted that Trinidad and Tobago’s relatively unique history - including the continuation of JAM’s ideology and the continued teachings of many of its members - has created a number of push and pull factors towards violent extremism. Fundamentalist Islamic mosques, including the Monroe Road mosque, one along the Southern Main Road, and others in Carapo and Rio Claro, continue to operate. Many ISIS recruits come from the Rio Claro Mosque headed by Nazim Mohammed, a former member of the JAM and a participant in the coup attempt. “East Trinidad, Diego Martin and east of Chaguanas, [remain] as ISIS recruiting hot-spots Based on interviews, he stated that local officials, residents, and foreign embassy officials expressed varying degrees of concern about Trinidad and Tobago’s need to prioritize handling violent extremism, radicalization, and terror recruitment. Many residents of neighborhoods with high recruitment rates see VE as a serious problem.

At the same time, though, more common, mundane sources of violence drive the spending and attention priorities of government officials. The number one issue in Trinidad and Tobago is gang violence, drugs, and the murder rates that have gone up. He cited one
embassy official who argued that it was difficult for them to sell all of these programs about not joining ISIS if they refuse to acknowledge to look at the day to day terrorism of being shot, attacked, raped. It is worth mentioning that a comparative look at radicalization rates among Muslim communities puts the nation closer to the center, rather than the extreme. Table 1 below demonstrates that among nations, Trinidad and Tobago’s foreign fighter contribution has been notable given its relatively small overall population but not the worst. Belgium, Ireland, and Tunisia top the charts, with radicalization rates roughly three times higher.

Table 1: ISIS recruiting rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Fighters</th>
<th>Muslim population</th>
<th>Recruits ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>628,000</td>
<td>7 per 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>49,000</td>
<td>6 per 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>11 million</td>
<td>6 per 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>393,000</td>
<td>4 per 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>3 per 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>27 million</td>
<td>2.7 per 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>476,000</td>
<td>2.4 per 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>339,000</td>
<td>2.4 per 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>2 per 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>1.6 per 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>3 million</td>
<td>1.6 per 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>1 million</td>
<td>1.4 per 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>212,000</td>
<td>1.4 per 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>8 million</td>
<td>0.7 per 1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>5 million</td>
<td>0.5 per 1,000</td>
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Note: Table adopted from data in The Guardian 26 February 2017
Given the documented recruitment issues that the nation of Trinidad and Tobago faces, we now turn to illuminating and evaluating its countering violent extremism programs.

In looking at Trinidad and Tobago Countering Violent Extremism Policies, Aldrich further noted that there are a wide variety of ways that state and non state actors can counter violent extremism. We use a straightforward, two axis approach based on whether the approach is proactive - taken before radicalization and behavior - or reactive, after radicalization, and whether the response is hard (based on the coercive power of the state) or soft (grounded in community based responses). Among the most common tools states have at their disposal are those revolving around their Weberian control over the legitimate use of force and coercion through policing and surveillance. Trinidad and Tobago has used these hard, reactive law enforcement tactics in managing violent extremism. Standard techniques have included surveillance and arrests of known or suspected terrorists.

Recalling that since 2014, the Trinidad and Tobago government agreed to sponsor the UN Security Council Resolution on terrorist fighters, Aldrich stated that in its related National Counter-terrorism strategy, the government stated it will pursue and investigate persons involved in terrorist related activity who may target the country and its interest and will bring such persons to justice. In its Pursue Pillar, the government has committed itself to stop terrorist attacks and its financing and ensure that terrorists are investigated, prosecuted and punished.

He also stated that the government added Legislative Amendments in relation to the Anti-terrorism Act, Chapter 12, the Proceeds of Crime Act, Chapter 11:27, the Financial Intelligence Unit Act 72:01 and the Non-Profit Organization Act, 2019. The government has recognized for example, that the main sources of terrorist financing are from private donations,
the abuse/misuse of non-profit organizations, and the proceeds of criminal activity. In response it set up the policing institutions to “follow the money.”

Less known in the grey-area between hard and soft tools and reactive and proactive ones would be the Citizen Security Program (CSP) which seeks to reduce crime and violence in selected high needs communities in Trinidad and Tobago through community actions and capacity building for the police. CSP, funded primarily through the Ministry of National Security, involves violence prevention training, community based interventions, youth friendly spaces, and NGO support, among other programs. The CSP was among the most commonly referenced program from decision makers asked about CVE programming

Beyond the gray area occupied by the CSP sit a larger category of soft approaches to countering violent extremism in the field of community development and NGO-driven capacity building. These include literacy building classes (such as the Adult Literacy Tutors Association), sports and martial arts (e.g. Endeavours Sports Club, Ryu Dan Dojo, and the Warreenvile United Sports Club), spoken word and drama focused NGO groups (such as the Quays Foundation and the Roots Foundation), and entrepreneurial and business training programs (e.g. Youth Entrepreneurship for Self Empowerment).

Many programs operating under the aegis of CVE programming with either local or foreign government support had little to do with ISIS recruitment or radicalism. Broadly speaking, Trinidadian NGOs receiving CVE funding do not imagine that they are solving violent extremism. Many of these NGOs have received financial and administrative assistance from foreign embassies in converting their existing programming to interventions which better align
with CVE approaches. Aldrich noted that a variety of development based soft programs in the country are used as countering violent extremism programs even though their philosophies are about community development and not connected to CVE itself. These include Trinidad and Tobago’s Community-Based Environmental Protection and Enhancement Program (CEPEP) and the Unemployment Relief Program (URP) which may be guided to financial communities where there have been hotspots of violence or crime. “What has been done to keep the radical elements in check is to open CEPEP, URP and construction projects to certain ‘companies’ with a view to prevent any extremist behavior in the country” (Interview with Trinadian Ministry of Defense official 2018).

In reviewing the in country CVE programs, Aldrich cited interviewees who saw a variety of challenges before they can be successful. Some denied the possibility of Western built or supported programs working in country. Others pointed to a lack of institutions and institutional capacity. Others active in the space argued that the plethora of NGOs are in fact competing for scarce financial resources and attention and several NGO leaders supported the argument that rather than cooperating, NGOs in Trinidad in the countering violent extremism field may see other groups as competitors.

In looking at a way forward, Aldrich encouraged systematic investments in local NGOs’ capacity and training in CVE, esp. theories of change. He also recommended that T&T government should work with foreign embassies, local NGOs, and local universities to quantitatively measure impact of existing programs and that returning fighters and their families should take center stage.

SESSION B :Human Trafficking, Community Intervention and Child Returnees in Trinidad and Tobago.
This session was chaired by Mr Keron Ganpat. Ms Alana Wheeler presented on the nexus between Human Trafficking (HT) and Terrorism in which she argued that terrorist groups benefit from organized crime-related activities, including HT; HT is one of the most profitable activities of organized crime. It generates annual profits of around $150 billion. Even though the HT/TF nexus is difficult to demonstrate, HT could represent a highly opportunistic source of revenue for terrorists; terrorism is increasingly interlinked with international organized crime and the trafficking of people, drugs, arms and corruption and there are some instances demonstrating that the nexus is not only theoretical but also concrete. She explained that the strategic use of human trafficking-related activities to the spread of terror and advance ideology; to the intimidation of populations and decimation of communities; to the institutionalization of sexual violence and slavery and to the incentivization and bolstering of recruitment. She noted that human trafficking-related activities can also constitute an opportunistic source of revenue as captives are sold in open slave markets or through online auctions; some are used as instruments to perform support/servitude roles while others are used as means to secure ransom/rescue payments.

Noting that there were a few cases of human trafficking in Trinidad and Tobago which were possible to have a link with terrorist activities, Ms Wheeler recommended the following: the raising of awareness regarding the possible use of human trafficking both as a tactic of terrorism and as an opportunistic source of revenue for terrorists; listing individuals involved in human trafficking; the consideration that involvement in human trafficking to finance terrorism be grounds for the designation of a person/entity pursuant to the asset-freezing mechanism established by States pursuant to UNSCR 1373 (2001); human trafficking should be examined as a potential money-laundering/terrorism-financing risk within the national risk assessment framework; enhancing cooperation/information-sharing mechanisms between domestic bodies respectively responsible for the investigation of human trafficking, terrorism, money-laundering
and terrorism financing and conducting parallel financial investigations in all human trafficking related cases.

The Children’s Authority also presented a paper in which the role and responsibilities of the institution were discussed. Among its many roles was the catering of Child returnees from Syria and Iraq. The Authority noted that Child Returnees constitute another group of vulnerable children in need of care and protection and there must be adherence to international conventions of which T&T is a signatory. It was noted that the CA is working on implementation plan for its suite of child protection services for child returnees and that there was a strong advocacy for the rights of child returnees, and for the systems and tools required for the proper implementation of a care and protection framework for child returnees. The Authority also noted that multi-stakeholder collaboration, funding, placement options and training were critically needed in Trinidad and Tobago and there was the urgent need for the state to have policies and protocols regarding child returnees.

Mr. Roger Harripersad presented on An Intelligence & Policing Community Intervention Program for Trinidad and Tobago: The Symbiosis of Improving One Community for All Communities. His introduction supported by extensive review of global and regional literature supported that effective policing begins with effective intelligence and that intelligence is an essential discipline that is necessary to support the Law Enforcement Community in its societal duties. He presented beyond-sufficient examples that intelligence can provide situational awareness, decision advantage- by presenting intelligence that can significantly aid in the improvement of the decision-making process, more importantly, community policing and relationship building. Additionally, he added that intelligence can provide notice of imminent threats, provide long-term strategic assessments, insight into key current events, knowledge concerning persons of interest and reports on specific matters. Regardless of the type of
intelligence, Mr. Harripersad projected that the single function that permeates all activities is the intelligence process also known as the intelligence cycle. This process specifies mechanisms to ensure the steady management of information that will be used to create intelligence to have a systemic, scientific, and logical methodology to comprehensively process information to ensure that the most accurate, actionable intelligence is produced and disseminated to the people who provide an operational response to prevent a criminal threat from reaching fruition in communities (Carter, 2009).

Placing strong emphasis on law enforcement communities, he explained that institutional restructuring without close examination of information handling, sharing and collaboration is self-defeating and does little to improve intelligence and policing. Substantiating further, he argues that on one hand, creation and shift of additional units and resources if not well managed runs risk of increasing the information silos within the policing and intelligence community. This consequently affects timely delivery of operational and tactical decision-making support from information and intelligence. On the other hand, new mandates for new units that use traditional intelligence and policing practices is simply self-defeating especially in Trinidad and Tobago, conceptualizing that locally first world threats are on the doorstep of third world practices to combat crime, violence and terrorism. Consequently, he posed the question that if the intelligence cycle is what drives the intelligence process from requirements to decision-making based on intelligence products, then what is the success of strategic restructuring and large expenditure of tactical assets? While his discussion focused on a complete intervention model for policing and intelligence, separately developed is a detailed model that goes further into specific unit restructuring and departmental using cutting edge intelligence and policing practices and tradecraft, especially bringing policing tactics for addressing and responding to violent extremism and terrorism.
Mr Harripersad explicitly presented perspectives of bottom-up ranging from policing tactics and procedures fused with intelligence, to decision-making from the products of proposed national intelligence model (NIM). His discussion established a proper understanding of intelligence and policing in national security and social communities. Encapsulated within his discussion was an intervention plan aimed at improving the role, processes, systems, integration into intelligence-led policing (ILP) and inter-agency standardization for an effective NIM focused on positively impacting social communities through improving policing and intelligence.

Mr. Rhion Karim presented on The Role of Intelligence and Cognitive Challenges in Intelligence Analysis. His introduction highlighted how intelligence operations and activities have been an integral part in the protection of states, laws, political systems, economic stability, societies and individuals. Giving examples of times ancient to present, he explained how battle commanders have used tactics such as the advantage of higher ground to gather information on the movement of enemy forces to the use of technology as a force multiplier from globalization’s advance compression of time and space. Yet, he showed that both vantage points from the strategic positioning and sophisticated technologies are both controlled by highly trained, skilled and well-equipped human practitioners in the intelligence community (IC), all prone to a fragile and complex challenge that is, cognitive biases of the human mind and risk of deception in the gathering intelligence for critical use in national and regional security. These complex challenges have contributed historically to inaccurate and generally poor intelligence production as well as the development of a dangerous game of espionage tradecraft within the IC. It aims to exploit inefficiencies IC activities and attempts to undermine
analysis and judgement in effort to deceive, misinform, manipulate and counter intelligence activities, both the IC and enemy engaging in these dangerous activities, known as counterintelligence (CI).

Despite much advances in technologies, analytical techniques and tradecraft development in intelligence especially analysis, Sun Tzu may have theorized a challenge the IC may endure for much of the unforeseen future:

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle (Sun Tzu, The Art of War, p. 6).”

His conceptual framework included observations and event post 9/11, where various governments and leading intelligence agencies recognized the paramount importance of the impact that cognitive challenges place on the quality, accuracy and protection of intelligence derived from information analysis to produce intelligence and additionally affect the consumer of these intelligence products, mainly policy makers and operational commanders. Poor analytical judgement derived from biases strangling critical thinking and analytical tradecraft account for catastrophic failures like previously mentions, as well as many other documented events, to be revealed in the review of literature.

Mr. Karim moved further drawing reference to one of the most successful intelligence professionals in the world and argues that Heuer (2010) describes analysis as crucial in building the rich picture from various sources of information collected. He
further describes that analysis of information may develop hypotheses that estimate what is happening under the surface of situations or events unfolding. Additionally, his discussion identified and highlighted the role of intelligence in national security by observing the concept of intelligence, how it impacts a country and its techniques, uses, constraints, and focus on cognitive challenges that preclude perceiving information in quest to analyze and derive intelligence. In an interactive session with the audience, he gave examples of intelligence applied and the challenges encountered by educating the audience on a thorough understanding of the intelligence context before diving into the essentials and challenges of analysis.

**THE WAY FORWARD. RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS**

With the technological advancement and changing narratives of globalization, terrorism has also undergone considerable transformation and it continues to evolve. Today, terror operatives and their groups are far more tech-savvy and globally connected, with an aim of achieving their goals through continuous innovation. The meeting concluded with a session of questions and answers.
1. It was recommended that Trinidad and Tobago, in keeping with the UN mandate to develop its own national plan of action to prevent violent extremism, focus on seven priority areas:

   - Dialogue and conflict prevention
   - Strengthening good governance, human rights and the rule of law
   - Engaging communities, especially Chaguanas, Rio Claro and Diego Martin.
   - Empowering youth
   - Gender equality and empowering women
   - Education, skill development and employment facilitation
   - Strategic communications, including through the Internet and social media

2. The need for systematic investments in local NGOs’ capacity and training in CVE, especially theories of change was strongly recommended.

3. T&T government should work with foreign embassies, local NGOs, and local universities to quantitatively measure impact of existing programs.

4. Returning fighters and their families should take center stage and there must be a comprehensive policy to treat with them.

5. The development of a Plan of Action to treat with migration, illegal immigrants, human trafficking and refugees
6. The development of a Plan of Action to treat with Transnational Organized Crime and Narcoterrorism and Border Security

7. The development of an Effective Intelligence Gathering Capability and the establishment of a Fusion center to collectively combat crime, terrorism and national security issues

8. The Creation of an Institute within the USC system on National Security, Terrorism and Intelligence and establishing MOUs and exchange of knowledge and personnel with other Universities, Global Entities and NGOs

The Coordinator of National Security and Intelligence program sincerely thanks and commends all participants, sponsors and the support team of the Conference. The Conference objectives in raising national and public awareness were achieved and overall the Conference was successful.
# Program Schedule

## DAILY PROGRAMME

**Day One: Wednesday 2nd October 2019**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SESSION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8:00am – 9:30am</td>
<td>Registration</td>
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| 9:30 am – 10:00 am | Opening Ceremony  
|               |   Prayer                                                                |
|               |   National Anthem                                                      |
|               |   Chair: Dr. Raghunath Mahabir (Opening Remarks) – 5 mins               |
|               |   President: Dr. Hilary Bowman (Greetings) (10 mins)                   |
| 10:00 – 10:45 am | KEYNOTE Speaker  
|               |   **Professor Muqtedar Khan** – *Shifting US Grand Strategy and its Impact on the Global War on Terror.*  
|               |   University of Delaware.                                               |
|               |   Chair: Prof. Leon Wilson                                              |
| 10:45am – 11:00 am | BREAK                                                                  |
| 11:00 – 1:00pm | ORAL PRESENTATION SESSIONS                                             |
|               | SESSION A: Violent Extremism and Counter Violent Extremism            |
|               |   · Attorney-at-Law Vyana Sharma – *Combating Terrorism: Legislative Interventions on the Anti-Terrorism Act, Foreign* |
Terrorist Fighters and International Obligations in Relation to Combatting Terrorism and Confiscation of Terrorist Property and Risk of NPO Abuse.

· **Imam Sheraz Ali** – The role of Imams in Trinidad mosques in catalysing the movement of followers to join radicalised movements in foreign lands.

. **H.E. Arun Kumar Sahu** – Relevance of Gandhi in Contemporary World

· **Dr Malisa Neptune-Figaro** – Exploring the relationship between Trinbagonians and Violent Islamic Extremism: A Closer Look at the Impact of the Social Context on Citizen’s Involvement in ISIS.

. **Mr Summar Iqbal**  – Pakistan’s Counter Terror Strategy since 2015.

. **Dr. Raghunath Mahabir** – Venezuelan Migration, Violent Extremism and Gang Violence: A Case Study of Trinidad and Tobago.

Chair: Mr. Keron Ganpat

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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12:45pm – 1:45pm</td>
<td>LUNCH</td>
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<tr>
<td>2:00pm – 4:00pm</td>
<td>ORAL PRESENTATION SESSIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>SESSION B: Youth, Women &amp; CVE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· <strong>Drs. Myrna Cintron and Camille Gibson</strong> – Patterns of Radicalization of</td>
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Youth in the United States.

- Dr Ashaki L Dore – Gang Imitation, Youth Radicalization and Violent Extremism.
- Mr. Rhion Karim – Intelligence and Counterintelligence Analysis in the Caribbean. Discussing the Cognitive/Psychological Challenges, Tools and Techniques for Improving Intelligence Trade-craft in Analysis.
- Mrs Vandana Siew Sankar-Ali – Children’s Authority Presentation

Chair: Dr. Wanda Chesney

6:00pm – 9:00pm Cultural Evening – Indian High Commission

DAILY PROGRAMME

Day Two: Thursday 3rd October 2019

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SESSION</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
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<tr>
<td>9:00am – 10:00am</td>
<td>Registration</td>
<td>USC Auditorium</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:00 – 10:45 am</td>
<td>KEYNOTE Speaker</td>
<td>USC Auditorium</td>
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<td><strong>Professor Simon Cottee – The Calypso Caliphate</strong></td>
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<td><em>Chair: Dr. Edward Clarke</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>10:45am – 11:00 am</td>
<td>BREAK</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00am – 1:00pm</td>
<td>ORAL PRESENTATION SESSIONS</td>
<td>USC Auditorium</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SESSION A: Media, Civil Society and</td>
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## Education in CVE

- **Prof. Yufei Wu and Melissa May** – *Countering Violent Extremism on Social Media and Cyberspace*

- **Dr. Georgina Chami** – *Social Media Mediating in Countering Violent Extremism.*

- **Mr. Fazal Karim (MP Chaguanas East)**

*The Role of Education in Preventing Violent Extremism.*

Chair: Pastor Terrance Brown

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<th>Time</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1:00pm – 2:00pm</td>
<td><strong>LUNCH</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2:00pm – 3:00pm</td>
<td><strong>SPECIAL PRESENTATION</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· <strong>Prof. Daniel Aldrich</strong> – <em>Countering Violent Extremism in Trinidad: An Evaluation</em></td>
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<td><strong>USC Auditorium</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>3:00pm – 3:30pm</td>
<td>· <strong>Ms Alana Wheeler</strong> – The Nexus Between Human Trafficking and Terrorism Chair: Dr. Edward Clarke</td>
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<td><strong>USC Auditorium</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>3:30pm – 4:30pm</td>
<td><strong>Feedback Session</strong></td>
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<td><strong>USC Auditorium</strong></td>
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